## **GNSS** loss and **GNSS** Interferences on Airbus A/C

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#### Background

On most of Airbus aircraft, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS<sup>1</sup>) signals are one of the main inputs used for aircraft positioning and time reference for on-board Communication, Navigation and Surveillance functions. The Airbus aircraft installations are compliant with applicable regulations and recommended practices on aeronautical usage of GNSS for Communication, Navigation and Surveillance applications.

Performance (accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity) of the aircraft positioning highly relies on the external GNSS signals. A degradation of the external GNSS signals due to external or internal interferences (also known as "GNSS RFI" or "jamming"<sup>2</sup>) can lead to a performance degradation of the computed aircraft position.

To ensure the robustness of the Airbus aircraft architecture, the systems also take into account inertial references and/or Navaids (i.e. VOR, DME) to augment and complement the aircraft position's accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity.

Therefore, when GNSS signals from satellite constellation are lost or degraded by interferences, depending on the duration, aircraft capabilities can be maintained, limited or lost during the flight. These effects on aircraft capabilities shall be considered in flight crew decisions: for example, assessment of the capability to fly PBN routes, procedures and approaches.

The objective of this article is to clarify the impact of GNSS signal loss and GNSS RFI on aircraft operations, and to provide recommendations on how to handle these events in the daily aircraft operations.

This document is divided into three parts:

- 1. <u>Cockpit effects</u> that can be observed by the flight crew during total loss of GNSS signal.
- 2. <u>Operational considerations</u> to be considered during flight preparation/flight/post-flight phases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) refers to a worldwide position and time determination system that includes one or more satellite constellations, aircraft receivers and system integrity monitoring, augmented as necessary to support required navigation performance for the intended operation. It includes the United States Global Positioning System (GPS) currently used by commercial aircraft, and augmentation systems such Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> GNSS Radio Frequency Interferences (GNSS RFI): The effect of unwanted energy due to one or a combination of emissions, radiations, or inductions upon reception in GNSS frequency band (1559 – 1610 MHz). GNSS RFI may induce a degradation of position performance (such as lower accuracy and integrity) or loss of information, but not leading to misleading or wrong information.

3. <u>Maintenance recommendations</u> to be considered during post-flight analysis after GNSS loss event.

## **Service** Engineering Support

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Manufacturer:		

### 1. COCKPIT EFFECTS

This chapter covers A320, A330, A340, A380 and A350 aircraft in hybrid configuration (i.e. GPS output sent to the IRS which sends a "hybridized" position to the FMS).

These aircraft are fitted with two MMRs, three ADIRUs and two (A320/A330/A340/A380) or three (A350) FMS to compute the aircraft position. The A/C position used by FMS for navigation purpose.

In case GPS data is lost due to GNSS RFI affecting both MMRs, the aircraft position source will switch to pure IRS and will enter into the so called coasting mode. If the integrity of GPIRS data is degraded enough then the position source will switch to other radio navigation based solution (from FMS) according to the availability of DME and VOR. If Navaids are not available, the aircraft position solution will switch to IRS only.

Besides, MMRs elaborate deviations relative to a flight path and distance to a runway datum point in xLS modes such as FLS, GLS and SLS. In case GPS data is lost due to GNSS RFI affecting both the MMRs, the xLS modes: GLS, SLS, FLS using GPS data will not be available.

- Cockpit effects are covered in section 1.1
- Description of the effects on system and functions are covered in section 1.2

#### **1.1 DESCRIPTION OF COCKPIT EFFECTS**

Important note: The below described effects may be observed if an A/C is operating in an area where RFI are present. Depending on the interference features (and A/C functions), the GPS receivers may be affected differently leading to the potential appearance of one or several of the effects described below.

#### <u>A320 / A330 / A340</u>

<u> </u>				
Field	Function	ND/PFD	ECAM ALERT / STATUS	ECAM INOP
	GPS	GPS PRIMARY LOST	NAV GPS x FAULT	GPS x
Navigation	GLS (*)	If GLS selected: - GLS Red flag - With NDs in the ROSE mode: • LOC & G/S Red flags • LOC & G/S deviation bar out of view Same behaviour in PFD	<u>NAV</u> GLS x FAULT	GLS x GPWS INOP SYS if GLS GLS AUTOLAND inhibite <u>NAV</u> GLS 1 FAULT + <u>N</u>
	FLS (*)		FLS LIMITED TO F-APP + RAW if GPS PRIMARY LOST	
	OANS (*)	ARPT NAV POS LOST		
	GPWS TERR (*)		NAV GPWS TERR DET FAULT	GPWS TERR
Surveillance	ADS-B std DO-260B (*)		<b>NAV ADS-B RPTG x FAULT</b> inhibited if <u>NAV</u> GPS 1 FAULT + <u>NAV</u> GPS 2 FAULT	ADS-B RPTG
	ADS-B In (*) (also called ATSAW)	ADS-B	<sup>1</sup> NAV ADS-B TRAF FAULT <sup>2</sup> NAV ADS-B FAULT <i>inhibited if NAV GPS 1 FAULT + NAV GPS 2 FAULT</i> <sup>1</sup> Post / <sup>2</sup> Pre FWC std: A320	<sup>1</sup> <b>ADS-B TRAF</b> <sup>2</sup> <b>ADS-B</b> 0 H2-F7; A330 T5; A340 L13
	ROW/ROP (*)		SURV ROW/ROP LOST inhibited if NAV GPWS TERR DET FAULT	ROW/ROP

#### Table 1.1: A320/A330/A340 Cockpit Effects description

(\*) Optional function, the effects can be shown only if the option has been selected for a given A/C

Other effects:

- GPS Data dashed on GPS MONITOR pages of MCDUs
- Total GPS loss leads to a red flag ("ALT") on grey background and red scale displayed on PFD, in case no air data are available.

PERATIVE SYSTEMS			
5 1 fault occurs ed if			
<u>NAV</u> GLS 2 FAULT			
3			

Field	Function	ND / PFD	ECAM ALERT / STATUS	ECAM ING
	GPS	GPS PRIMARY LOST	NAV GPS x FAULT	GPS x
Navigation	GLS (*)	If GLS selected: - GLS Red flag on ND - With NDs in the ROSE mode: • LOC & G/S Red flags • LOC & G/S deviation bar out of view Same behaviour on PFD	<b>NAV</b> GLS x FAULT SURV GPWS 1+2 FAULT (only shown on ground for maintenance purposes, only when both GLS are lost)	GLS x GLS AUTOLAND inhibited in case of <u>NAV</u> GPWS 1+2
	FLS (*)		FLS LIMITED TO F-APP+RAW if GPS PRIMARY LOST	
	OANS (*)	ARPT NAV POS LOST		
	GPWS TERR	<b>WX GND CLUT</b> (anti clutter function not avail)	SURV TERR SYS × FAULT	TERR SYS x
Surveillance	ADS-B Out		ADS-B POS RPTG LOST	ADS-B RPTG
	ROW/ROP (*)	PFD: <b>RUNWAY TOO SHORT</b> could be spuriously raised on OANS Std pre 6.3 (refer to TFU 34.38.00.002)	<b><u>SURV</u>ROW/ROP LOST</b> inhibited in case of <u>NAV</u> GPS 1 FAULT + <u>NAV</u> GPS 2 FAULT	ROW/ROP BTV (*)

## Table 1.2: A380 Cockpit Effects description


(\*) Optional function, the effects can be shown only if the option has been selected for a given A/C


#### Other effects:

- Data dashed on POSITION/GPS Page of both MFD
   Total GPS loss leads to a red flag ("ALT") on grey background and red scale displayed on PFD, in case no air data are available.

## <u>A350</u>

Field	Function	ND/PFD	ECAM ALERT / STATUS	ECAM INOPERATIVE
	GPS	NAV PRIMARY LOST	NAV GNSS x FAULT	GNSS x
	GLS (*)	If GLS selected: - GLS Red flag - With NDs in the ROSE mode:	<b>NAV</b> GLS x FAULT GLS limited to APPR1 if only one side lost	GLS x GLS AUTOLAND inhibited in case of FAULT
Navigation	SLS (*)	If SLS selected: - SLS Red flag - With NDs in the ROSE mode:	<u>NAV</u> SLS x FAULT	SLS x
	FLS (*)		FLS LIMITED TO F-APP+RAW if GNSS 1+2 FAULT	





				1
	RNP AR only displayed during RNP AR operations		NAV RNP AR CAPABILITY DOWNGRADED if <u>NAV</u> GNSS x FAULT x=1 or 2 ECAM status/INFO: "FOR RNP AR : MINIMUM LIMITED TO RNP 0.3" Note: post FWS S5.2 and post PRIM P8 occurrence rate is reduced (ref TFU 22.00.00.201) NAV RNP AR CAPABILITY LOST If <u>NAV</u> GNSS 1+2 FAULT	RNP AR (in case of RN
	ANF (*)	ARPT NAV POS LOST		
	GPWS TERR	MAP NOT AVAIL WX GND CLUT (anticlutter function not avail))	SURV TERR SYS FAULT x	TERR SYS x
	ADS-B Out		ADS-B POS RPTG LOST	ADS-B RPTG 1 + 2
Surveillance	ADS-B In (*) (also called ATSAW)		SURV ADS-B TRAFFIC x FAULT	ADS-B TRAFFIC x
	ROW/ROP (*)		<b>SURV ROW/ROP LOST</b> inhibited in case of <u>NAV</u> GPS 1 FAULT + <u>NAV</u> GPS 2 FAULT	ROW/ROP BTV

#### Table 1.3: A350 Cockpit Effects description

(\*) Optional function, the effects can be shown only if the option has been selected for a given A/C

#### Other effects:

- Data dashed on POSITION/GNSS Page of both MFD
- Total GPS loss leads to a red flag ("ALT") on grey background and red scale displayed on PFD, in case no air data are available.

### 1.2 SUMARY OF FUNCTIONAL AND SYSTEM EFFECTS

#### 1.2.1 Navigation

In case of GPS total loss, the cockpit effects listed in section 1.1 could be observed. The table below contains the functional and system effects corresponding to cockpit effects on the ND, ECAM alerts/status/ INOP sys.

SYSTEMS	A320 A330/A340	A380	
MMR	All Phases: Loss of GPS Navigation functions.		All Phases: Loss of GPS a the loss.
мык	Approach & Landing: Loss of GLS deviations.		Approach & Landing: Los
ADIRU	into coasting mode. GPIRS position drifts and stay	ses: The hybridization between GPS measurements and IRS data is lost and GPIRS position enters asting mode. GPIRS position drifts and stay valid when the A/C is in flight.	
Clock	All Phases: Clock will not be synchronized with UTC internal reference. At aircraft power up the UTC dis	time provided by GPS; Clock is maintained based on its plays zero's in case of unavailability of GPS signal.	<u>All Phases:</u> Clock will not GPS; Clock is maintained

RNP AR CAPABILITY LOST)

A350

S and SBAS Navigation functions for the duration of Loss of GLS deviations and SLS deviations. lization between GPS measurements and IRS data is n enters into coasting mode. GPIRS position drifts tion switches to an alternate navigation mode that n solution accuracy and integrity among: radio ion. Distion switches on IRS position. ned according to ADIRS internal clock ht crew needs to enter position manually to align not be synchronized with UTC time provided by ned based on ADIRS clock function.

ISIS	Approach & Landing: GLS deviations are not available.	<u>Approach &amp; Landing</u> : GLS parameters (deviations, course, and channel) are not available. Aircraft position and velocity coming from MMR is invalid.	Approach & Landing: GLS channel) are not availabl and velocity coming from
Flight Guidance FMGC (A320) FMGEC (A330/A340) FCGU/PRIM (A380&A350)	<u>Approach</u> functions requiring GPS are not available: GLS, FLS (in case of RNAV (GNSS)) and RNP AR.	<u>Approach</u> functions requiring GPS are not available: GLS, FLS (in case of RNAV (GNSS)) and RNP AR. The functions BTV, ROW/ROPS are not available.	<u>Approach</u> functions requi case of RNAV (GNSS)) au The functions BTV, ROW,
Flight Management FMGC (A320) FMGEC (A330/A340) FMS (A380&A350)	<u>All Phases</u> : The aircraft position solution will switch from GPIRS to radio navaids and inertial position. GPS data are dashed in the GPS monitor page.		<u>All Phases</u> : The aircraft p irrespective of GPS loss. GPS data are dashed in t
Airport Navigation OANS (A320/A330/A340/A380) ANF (A350)	<u>Approach &amp; Landing:</u> The aircraft position cannot be computed and displayed on the airport moving map. Loss of support to Airport Navigation, Runway Approaching Advisory and BTV/ROPS (on A380 only) functions from OANS.		Approach & Landing: The ADIRU. Loss of support to Airpor BTV/ROPS and TOS2 fun

#### Table 1.4: Functional and System Effect for Navigation System

Note: The above described functional or system effects may not always be observed due to GPS total loss, but these are the alerts/warning that could arise in case of potential RFI or due to GPS data loss.

#### 1.2.2 Surveillance

In case of GPS total loss, the cockpit effects discussed in section 1.1 could be observed. The table below contains the functional and system effects corresponding to cockpit effects on the ND, ECAM alerts/status/ INOP sys.

SYSTEMS		320 /A340	A380	A350
TCAS	All Phases: Loss of ATSAW function*		Part of AESS ATSAW function not available on A380	Part of AESS <u>All Phases:</u> Loss of ATSAW function
XPDR	<u>All Phases</u> : GPS parameters are invalid within ADS-B out messages (position integrity tagged as degraded).		Part of AESS <u>All Phases</u> : GPS parameters are invalid within ADS-B out messages (position integrity tagged as degraded). Note: A380 and A350 ADS-B function is more robust with respect to A320/A330/A340 as it is based on GPIRS position. GPIRS position enters in coasting mode and can remain available longer than GPS position.	
TAWS (EGPWC/ GPWC, T3CAS)	Take-off, en-route & approach: In case of invalid GPS position, the TAWS use the alternate position computed by the FM or the IRS. <u>Approach</u> , <u>Landing &amp; on Ground</u> : Loss of ROW/ROP, RAAS functions**		Part of AESS. <u>All Phases:</u> No immediate loss thanks to back-u may be expected after certain time : – Potential loss of envelope modulation (when p – Potential loss of predictive terrain alerts and o	
WXR	N/A	N/A	Part of AESS <u>All Phases:</u> WXR – Potential loss of ground decl	utter function (when position too degraded)
Conditions	ONLY IF ATSAW FUNCTION CONFIGURED* ONLY IF GPS configuration and RAAS FUNCTION ACTIVATED**			

#### Table 1.5: Functional and System Effect Description for Surveillance Systems

Note: The above described functional or system effects may not always be observed due to GPS total loss, but these are the alerts/warning that could arise in case of potential RFI or due to GPS data loss.

#### 1.2.3 OTHERS

The table below contains the functional and system effects of the communication systems ATSU, SATCOM and other systems such as BUSS or BOW ROTOR:

GLS and SLS parameters (deviations, course, and able during approach and landing. Aircraft position om MMR is invalid.

quiring GPS are not available: SLS, GLS, FLS (in and RNP AR. W/ROPS are not available

position provided by the ADIRU is used s. the GNSS monitor page.

he aircraft position used by ANF is provided by

ort Navigation, Runway Approaching Advisory, unctions from ANF.

SYSTEMS	ІМРАСТ
SATCOM	Some impact anticipated due to the SATCOM frequency band (1626.5 MHz) being close to the GPS L1 frequency band (1575.42 MHz).
ATSU	No impact. AFN messages timestamp will not be synchronized with UTC time provided by GPS. The source of the timestamp switches to either: A only), CLOCK, CMC/CFDIU.
BUSS	In case of total loss of GPS, GPS altitude will not be available.
BOW ROTOR	Computed time to cool the engine will be augmented by 3 minutes

## Table 1.6: Functional and System Effect Description for other Systems

Note: The above described functional or system effects may not always be observed due to GPS total loss, but these are the alerts/warnings that could arise in case of potential RFI or due to GPS data loss.

ADIRU (A350

## 2. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The effects of GNSS loss detailed in section 1 should be considered in airline's operations in order to ensure the safe operation of the aircraft.

#### During the flight preparation:

The operators should consider the NOTAMs related to known or expected GNSS RFI. If a NOTAM is applicable to the flight, the availability of non GNSS-Based routes, procedures and approaches (such as ILS, VOR and DME) shall be checked for the affected area.

#### During the flight phase:

The loss of GNSS data is detected by the systems which indicate associated loss of capability and messages on cockpit displays. All additional impacts on aircraft capabilities are detected by the systems and indicated on ECAM displays and ND as defined in section 1.

<u>Note1</u>: Aircraft functions apply different confirmation times before declaring the loss of GNSS data or to declare the loss of a capability. Not all ECAM messages will therefore appear at the same time.

<u>Note 2:</u> The GPS/GNSS position may be displayed in with dashes ('-') and the number of tracked satellites ("NBR OF SAT") maybe abnormally low or null.

- ⇒ When flying in an area affected by GNSS RFI, if the flight crew observes the cockpit effects described in section 1, the existing FCOM normal and abnormal/emergency procedures apply and shall be followed.
- Airbus does not specifically require to deselect GPS: the GNSS RFI can be transitory and normal navigation mode based on GNSS data (A320/A330/A340/A380 "GPS PRIMARY" or A350 "NAV PRIMARY" displayed on ND), as well as communication and surveillance functions can be recovered.
- ⇒ When ADS-B OUT is required in the flight area or on the current route, the flight crew should notify ATC of the loss of ADS-B OUT reporting due to the loss of the GNSS signal.

#### During the post-flight phase:

Airbus recommends to perform the following actions after a flight with possible GNSS RFI:

- Flight crew should report possible GPS interferences and associated cockpit effects to the maintenance team,
- Maintenance team should apply recommended action detailed in section 3 (system tests, data collection, reporting to Airbus engineering or flight operations support),
- Operator should report any identified suspected GNSS RFI events to regional (e.g. ANSPs) and international organizations (e.g. EUROCONTROL's Voluntary ATM Incident Reporting (EVAIR)) in order to facilitate and accelerate GNSS RFI event confirmation/resolution, and generate NOTAM to operators' community.

## 3. MAINTENANCE RECOMMENDATIONS

The alerts described in section1 may point to a real defect of a system. In order to confirm that the events were not due to equipment failure, maintenance actions need to be carried out.

The required maintenance actions depend on the context under which the faults have been observed. In this article, we consider three different use cases:

- 1. Case 1: Transient symptoms observed when A/C overflies a known GNSS RFI area
- 2. Case 2: Transient symptoms observed in an area not known for GNSS RFI
- 3. Case 3: Symptoms observed during GPS interferences exposure not covered in section 1

# 3.1 <u>CASE1</u> – TRANSIENT SYMPTOMS OBSERVED WHEN A/C OVERFLIES A KNOWN GNSS RFI AREA

In this case, symptoms described in section 1 of this article are confirmed to be transient and observed when the A/C was overflying a known GPS interference area (e.g. NOTAM available or analysis/experience confirmed GNSS disturbances affecting this area). Effects disappear during flight after leaving the affected area.

Once on ground AIRBUS recommends performing the following actions:

Note: The list of associated maintenance tasks references can be found in Table 3.1

- 1. Reset both MMR 1 and MMR 2 (power off >10 sec)
- 2. Perform MMR 1 and MMR 2 system test
- 3. Perform IR system test
- 4. If ADS-B Out function was affected, perform ATC1 and ATC2 system test
- 5. If OANS function was affected, perform OANS system test
- 6. If TAWS function was affected, perform TAWS system test
- 7. If ADS-B In (ATSAW) function was affected, perform TCAS system test
- 8. If ROW/ROP function was affected, perform
  - A320/A330/A340/A350 family: GPWS system test
  - A380: OANS system test

If all the tests are OK neither further troubleshooting nor LRU removal is required. Please, note that new LRUs will exhibit same behavior when exposed to the same interferences.

If a fault is confirmed, perform troubleshooting as per the applicable TSM task.

Special cases:

- If the GPS interference is still present on ground the tests might not pass. In case of known interference on ground, the operator can either move the A/C to a non-affected location or apply MEL for affected equipment. Systems nominal behavior should be retrieved soon after leaving the interference area.
- Please report the event to AIRBUS if normal system behavior was not recovered after exiting the RFI area.

TASK	A/C TYPE	AMM / MP(A350) REFERENCE		
MMR reset	A320/A330/ A340/A380	AMM Task 34-34-00-860-801-A – Reset of the Multi-Mode Receiver		
IR	A320FAM	AMM TASK 34-14-00-740-004-A SYSTEM TEST of the Inertial Reference (IR)		
	A330/A340	AMM TASK 34-14-00-740-803-A SYSTEM TEST of the Inertial Reference (IR)		
System test	A380	AMM TASK 34-10-00-740-802-A BITE Test of the IR (System Test)		
	A350	AMM TASK A350-A-34-1X-XX-00001-343A-A BITE Test of the Inertial Reference (IR) (System Test)		
	A320/A330/ A340	AMM Task 34-36-00-740-003-A – BITE test of the MMR		
MMR BITE test	A380	AMM Task BITE Test of the MMR (System Test		
BITE lest	A350	MP TASK A350-A-34-36-XX-00001-343A-A – BITE Test of the Multi- Mode Receiver (MMR) (System Test)		
АТС	A320	<pre>ATC standalone: AMM Task 34-52-00-74-004-A - BITE Test of the ATC T3CAS: AMM Task 34-72-00-740-001-A - BITE Test of the T/TISS → SUBTASK 34-72-00-740-053-A C. BITE Test of the T/TISS (ATC2 part)</pre>		
BITE test	A330/A340	AMM Task 34-52-00-740-801-A – BITE test of the Air Traffic Control (ATC)		
	A380	AMM Task 34-71-00-740-803-A – BITE Test of the AESS (Master AESU XPDR/TCAS Test)		

		MP Task A350-A-34-71-XX-02001-343A-A – BITE Test of the Aircraft	
	A350	Environment Surveillance System (AESS) (Master-AESU XPDR/TCAS Module-Test)	
OANS BITE Test	A320/A330/ A340/A380	AMM Task 34-38-00-740-801-A – BITE Test of the Onboard Aircraft Navigation System (OANS) (System Test)	
	A320	<ul> <li>GPWS: AMM Task 34-48-00-740-002-A BITE Test of the GPWS</li> <li>EGPWS: AMM Task 34-48-00-740-002-B BITE Test of the GPWS</li> <li>T2CAS: AMM TASK 34-43-00-740-004-A Bite Test of the T2CAS → SUBTASK 34-43-00-740-054-A B.BITE Test of the T2CAS (TAWS part)</li> <li>T3CAS: AMM Task 34-72-00-740-001-A - BITE Test of the T/TISS → SUBTASK 34-72-00-740-052-F B.BITE Test of the T/TISS (TAWS part)</li> </ul>	
GWPS BITE Test	A330/A340	<ul> <li>EGPWS: AMM TASK 34-48-00-740-801-B Operational Test of the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning (GPW) Computer by BITE</li> <li>T2CAS: AMM Task 34-43-00-740-802-A BITE Test of the Traffic and Terrain Collision Avoidance System (T2CAS) → SUBTASK 34-43-00-740-054-A B.BITE Test of the T2CAS (TAWS part)</li> <li>T3CAS: AMM TASK 34-72-00-740-801-A BITE Test of the T/TISS → SUBTASK 34-72-00-740-051-D B.BITE Test of the T/TISS (TAWS part)</li> </ul>	
	A380	AMM TASK 34-71-00-740-802-A – BITE Test of the AESS (Master AESU TAWS Test)	
	A350	MP TASK A350-A-34-71-XX-01001-343A-A BITE Test of the Aircraft Environment Surveillance System (AESS) (Master AESU TAWS Module Test	
	A320	<ul> <li>TCAS: TASK 34-43-00-740-001-A BITE Test of the TCAS</li> <li>T2CAS: AMM TASK 34-43-00-740-004-A Bite Test of the T2CAS → SUBTASK 34-43-00-740-053-A A.BITE Test of the T2CAS (TCAS part)</li> <li>T3CAS: AMM Task 34-72-00-740-001-A - BITE Test of the T/TISS → SUBTASK 34-72-00-740-051-A A.BITE Test of the T/TISS (TCAS part)</li> </ul>	
TCAS BITE Test	A330/A340	<ul> <li>TCAS: TASK 34-43-00-740-801-A - BITE test of the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)</li> <li>T2CAS: AMM Task 34-43-00-740-802-A BITE Test of the Traffic and Terrain Collision Avoidance System (T2CAS) → SUBTASK 34-43-00-740-053-A A.BITE Test of the T2CAS (TCAS part)</li> <li>T3CAS: AMM TASK 34-72-00-740-801-A BITE Test of the T/TISS → SUBTASK 34-72-00-740-050-A A. BITE Test of the T/TISS (TCAS part)</li> </ul>	
	A380	AMM Task 34-71-00-740-803-A – BITE Test of the AESS (Master AESU XPDR/TCAS Test)	
	A350	MP Task A350-A-34-71-XX-02001-343A-A – BITE Test of the Aircraft Environment Surveillance System (AESS) (Master-AESU XPDR/TCAS Module-Test)	

#### Table 3.1: Maintenance tasks references

#### 3.2 <u>CASE2</u> – TRANSIENT SYMPTOMS OBSERVED IN AN <u>AREA NOT KNOWN FOR</u> <u>GPS INTERFERENCES</u>

In case a GNSS RFI is suspected and the area is not known to be affected via a NOTAM entry or previous experience, an analysis needs to be performed in order to confirm the root cause.

The analysis consists in the study of all potential sources of GNSS perturbation: aircraft and/or receiver failure, GNSS constellation anomaly, environment masking, multipath or space weather. In case all of those potential sources are discarded, then it is likely that a GNSS RFI occurred.

Please report such a case to AIRBUS together with further information in order to allow an assessment of the event and to confirm to if it can be linked to RFI or if regular troubleshooting is required on A/C.

Information to be provided for analysis:

A320 / A330 / A340 A38	30 A350
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Post Flight Report	Post Flight Report	Post Flight Report
	CMS dump	CMS dump
Flight data:	Flight data:	Flight data:
- DFDR/QAR	- DFDR/QAR	- DFDR/QAR
- DAR if customization	- SAR 58 (this report	- SAR 99 (this report contains
available including	contains useful GPS	useful GPS information)
additional GPS/ADIRU	information)	
parameters		
Pilot Report:	Pilot Report:	Pilot Report:
- Detailed event report	- Detailed event report	- Detailed event report
- Picture of FMS pages in	- POSITION/GPS Page	- POSITION/GNSS Page
MCDU:	status during events (MFD)	status during events (MFD)
- GPS MONITOR - POSITION MONITOR		
- IRS MONITOR		
- IRS MONITOR MMR data:	MMR data:	MMR data:
- Troubleshooting Data	- Troubleshooting Data (TSD)	<ul> <li>Troubleshooting Data (TSD)</li> </ul>
(TSD) - GPS REPORT for MMR	- GPS REPORT	- GPS REPORT
Rockwell Collins GLU-925	Accessible via $OMT \rightarrow$	Accessible via OMT $\rightarrow$
or Honeywell RMA 55B (*)	SYSTEM REPORT	SYSTEM REPORT TEST
Accessible via MDCU $\rightarrow$	TEST $\rightarrow$ ATA 34 $\rightarrow$	$\rightarrow$ ATA 34 $\rightarrow$ MMR $\rightarrow$
SYSTEM REPORT TEST	$MMR \rightarrow SPECIFIC$	SPECIFIC DATA
$\rightarrow$ MMR $\rightarrow$ SPECIFIC	DATA	
DATA		
IR data:	IR data:	IR data:
- TSD of IR1, IR2 and IR3	- GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT	- GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT
- GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT	Accessible via OMT $\rightarrow$	Accessible via OMT →
(Northrop Grumman ADIRU	SYSTEM REPORT	SYSTEM REPORT TEST
and Honeywell Block III(**)	TEST → ATA 34 → IR →	$\rightarrow$ ATA 34 $\rightarrow$ IR $\rightarrow$
Accessible via MDCU →	SPECIFIC DATA	SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS
SYSTEM REPORT TEST		
$\rightarrow$ IR $\rightarrow$ SPECIFIC DATA		

#### Table 3.2: Information to be provided to evaluate presence of GPS interferences

(\*) MMR with "GPS REPORT" menu:

- Collins GLU-925 P/N 822-1821-430 (A320/A330/A340/A380)
- Honeywell RMA-55B P/N 066-50029-1161 (A320/A330/A340)

(\*\*) ADIRUs with "GPIRS REPORT" menu:

- Honeywell Block III P/N HG2030BE0x
- Northrop Grumman P/N 465020-0303-0318, 465020-0304-0318, P/N 465020-
  - 0303-0316, P/N 465020-0304-0316

#### If the event is confirmed to be related to GNSS RFI:

Recommendations given in chapter 3.1 apply. We recommend the A/L to report any identified suspected GNSS RFI events to regional (e.g. ANSPs) and international organizations (e.g. EUROCONTROL's Voluntary ATM Incident Reporting (EVAIR)) in order to facilitate and accelerate GNSS RFI event confirmation/resolution, and generate NOTAM to operators' community

If the event is not confirmed to be related to GNSS interference

Regular troubleshooting to be applied as per TSM.

## 3.3 <u>CASE3</u> – EFECTS DURING GPS INTERFERENCES EXPOSURE NOT COVERED IN CHAPTER 1

If an A/L suspects GNSS RFI and observes effects not covered in chapter 1, we recommend contacting AIRBUS for further event analysis.

For instance, AIRBUS has received reports about different kind of events potentially linked to GNSS RFI exposure such as:

- GPS losses not recovered during flight with Collins GLU-925 P/N 822-1821-430 (already understood and documented. See TFU 34.36.00.030)
- Spurious GPWS (TAWS) alerts
- ADS-B Out erroneous position

These represent unexpected behaviour and require investigation.

We recommend A/Ls to provide AIRBUS with the following information along with the event report to help events analysis:

	A320 / A330 / A340	A380	A350
General GPS analysis	Post Flight Report	Post Flight Report CMS dump	Post Flight Report CMS dump
information	Flight data:	Flight data:	Flight data:
(Equivalent to Table 3.2)	<ul> <li>DFDR/QAR</li> <li>DAR if customization available including additional GPS/ADIRU parameters</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>DFDR/QAR</li> <li>SAR 58 (this report contains useful GPS information)</li> </ul>	- DFDR/QAR - SAR 99 (this report contains useful GPS information)
	Pilot Report:	Pilot Report:	Pilot Report:
	<ul> <li>Detailed event report</li> <li>Picture of FMS pages in MCDU:         <ul> <li>GPS MONITOR</li> <li>POSITION</li> <li>MONITOR</li> <li>IRS MONITOR</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Detailed event report</li> <li>POSITION/GPS Page status during events ( MFD)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Detailed event report</li> <li>POSITION/GNSS Page status during events ( MFD)</li> </ul>
	MMR data:	MMR data:	MMR data:
	<ul> <li>Troubleshooting Data (TSD)</li> <li>GPS REPORT for MMR Rockwell Collins GLU-925 or Honeywell RMA 55B (*) Accessible via MDCU → SYSTEM REPORT TEST → MMR → SPECIFIC DATA</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Troubleshooting Data (TSD)</li> <li>GPS REPORT Accessible via OMT → SYSTEM REPORT TEST → ATA 34 → MMR → SPECIFIC DATA</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Troubleshooting Data (TSD)</li> <li>GPS REPORT Accessible via OMT → SYSTEM REPORT TEST → ATA 34 → MMR → SPECIFIC DATA</li> </ul>
	IR data:	IR data:	IR data:
	<ul> <li>TSD of IR1, IR2 and IR3</li> <li>GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT (Northrop Grumman ADIRU and Honeywell Block III(**) Accessible via MDCU → SYSTEM REPORT TEST → IR → SPECIFIC DATA</li> </ul>	- GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT Accessible via OMT → SYSTEM REPORT TEST → ATA 34 → IR → SPECIFIC DATA	- GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT Accessible via OMT → SYSTEM REPORT TEST → ATA 34 → IR → SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS
In case of a spurious TAWS warning	Depending on A/C GPWS computer configuration : - T2CAS dump or - T3CAS dump or	Not possible to dump AESU on wing	Not possible to dump AESU on wing
	- EGPWS dump		
In case of an ADS-B Out issue	- Air Traffic Control repo	ort together with ADS-B randle (data to be requested to Level)	

- Was the pilot requested to switch transponder? Did the situation change done?		<ul> <li>ATC transponder side in use during events</li> <li>Was the pilot requested to switch transponder? Did the situation change if done?</li> </ul>
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## Table 3.3: Information to be provided in case of different symptoms

## 4. GLOSSARY

A/C	Aircraft
A/C	Aircraft
ACMS	Aircraft Condition Monitoring System
ADIRS	Air Data and Inertial Reference System Air Data and Inertial Reference Unit
ADIRU	Air Data and Inertial Reference Unit Aircraft Environment Surveillance System
AESS AFN	ATC Facilities Notification
ANF ATSAW	Airport Navigation Function Airborne Traffic Situation Awareness
ATSU	Air Traffic Service Unit
BTV	Brake To Vacate
BUSS	Back Up Speed Scale
CFDIU	Central Fault Display Interference Unit
CFDIO	Central Fault Display System
CMC	Central Maintenance Computer
CMC	Central Maintenance Computer
DAR	Digital AIDS Recorder (A320)
DAR	Digital ACMS Recorder (A320)
DFDR	Digital Flight Data Recorder
DLCS	Data Loading Configuration System
DMC	Display Management Computer
DME	Distance Measuring Equipment
ECAM	Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring
EFB	Electronic Flight Bag
EGPWC	Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Computer
EGPWS	Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
EICU	EFB interface Control Unit
EIS	Electronic Instrument System
EIU	Electronic Instrument Unit
EPE	Estimated Position Error
EPU	Estimated Position Uncertainty
FANS	Future Air Navigation System
FDIF	Flight Data Interface Function
FLS	FMS Landing System
FMC	Flight Management Computer
FMG (E)C	Flight Management Guidance and (Envelope) Computer
FMS	Flight Management System
FOM	Figure Of Merit
FOMAX	Flight Operation and MAintenance eXchanger
FWC	Flight Warning Computer
FWS	Flight Warning System
GBAS	Ground Based Augmentation System
GLS	GBAS Landing System
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System
GPIRS	GPS and IRS mixed data
GPIKS	Global Positioning System
GPS	Ground Proximity Warning System
HDOP	Horizontal Dilution Of Precision
HFOM	Horizontal Figure Of Merit
HIL	Horizontal Integrity Limit
HIPL	Horizontal Integrity Protection Level
HUD	Head Up Display
HUDC	Head Up Display Computer
IFE	In Flight Entertainment
IRS	Inertial Reference System
ISIS	Integrated Standby Instrument System
LOC	Localizer
ELT	Emergency Locator Transmitter
MCDU	Multipurpose Control Display Unit

MFD	Multi Functions Display
MMR	Multi-Mode Receiver
ND	Navigation Display
NSE	Navigation System Error
OANS	Onboard Airport Navigation System
PFD	Primary Flight Display
PRAIM	Predictive Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
PRIM	PRIMary System
PVT	Position, Velocity, Time
RAAS	Runway Awareness and Advisory System
RFI	Radio Frequency Interference
RNP	Required Navigation Performance
RNP AR	Required Navigation Performance Authorization Required
ROPS	Runway Overrun Prevention System
ROW	Runway Overrun Warning
RVSM	Reduced Vertical Separation Minima
SATCOM	SATellite COMmunication
SBAS	Satellite Based Augmentation System
SCI	Secure Communication Interface
SLS	SBAS Landing System
TAWS	Terrain Avoidance and Warning System
TCAS	Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
TOS	Take Off Securing
UTC	Universal Time Coordinated
VDOP	Vertical Dilution Of Precision
VHF	Very High Frequency
VIL	Vertical Integrity Limit
VOR	VHF Omnidirectional Range
WXR	Weather Radar
XPDR	Transponder
WXR	Weather Radar

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